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Rosenblum et al.: Updates from the Regional Human Rights Systems

UPDATES FROM THE REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMS
INTER-AMERICAN
HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM
Cinco Pensionistas v. Pe ru and Juan Humberto
Sánchez v. Honduras a re among the first cases to
be decided by the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights (Court) under the new procedural rules passed in 2001. Among the new rules is
a provision that allows the victims’ counsel to
allege violations of the American Convention on
Human Rights (Convention) in its complaint to
the Court that have not been alleged by the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(Commission). Previously, the Court would only
hear evidence of violations alleged by the
Commission.
In Cinco Pensionistas, decided on Fe b ru a ry
28, 2003, the victims’ counsel exercised their
new right to allege a violation of the connvention
that was not alleged by the Commission.
Although the Court did not find the particular
violation alleged, it is nonetheless significant that
the victims’ counsel was able to bring the claim
e ven though the Commission did not make a
concurrent allegation. A significant jurispru d e ntial development was the Court’s identification
of the right to a social service, in this case a pension, as a private pro p e rty right. A negative
development, howe ve r, was the Court’s decision
to narrowly interpret protections of economic,
social, and cultural rights under the Convention.
In Juan Hu m b e rto Sánchez, decided on June
7, 2003, the Court heard the first case of forced
disappearance and extrajudicial exe c u t i o n
against Honduras since deciding Velasquez
Rodriguez v. Honduras in 1988. This is significant in that the Court felt compelled to reiterate
what it had recommended to Honduras 15 years
ago regarding judicial reform and respect for
human rights. Additionally, this case marks a significant development in the interpretation of
violations of the right to life and clarifies the definition of arbitrary and illegal detentions in its
discussion of the right to personal libert y.

CINCO PENSIONISTAS V. PERU
The victims in this case were five Peruvian government employees whose pensions were arbitrarily reduced in 1992. The five pensioners had
worked for a government agency for over twenty
years and were guaranteed a pension at a level
stipulated by Pe ruvian domestic law. In 1992, the
government significantly reduced their pensions.

The five pensioners brought their claim to
the Su p reme Court of Pe ru in 1994. The
Supreme Court ordered the government to
restore their pensions. When the government
failed to do so, they went before the
Constitutional Tribunal of Pe ru, which instructed the government to comply with the Supreme
C o u rt verdict. The government again failed to
comply with this order.
In February 1998 the Human Rights
Program of the Labor Ad v i s o ry Center of Peru
(CEDAL) and the Association for Human
Rights (APRODEH), filed a petition with the
Commission alleging that the Pe ruvian gove r nment had arbitrarily reduced the wages of the
f i ve pensioners. The Commission decided in
favor of the pensioners after a merits hearing and
brought the case before the Court in December
2001. CEDAL and the Center for Justice and
International Law (CEJIL) acted jointly as the
pensioners’ counsel before the Court. Together,
the Commission and the pensioners’ counsel
alleged that the Pe ruvian government violated
A rticles 21 (right to private pro p e rty), 25 (right
to judicial protection), and 26 (right to progressive development of economic, social, and cultural rights) of the Convention. Additionally, the
pensioners’ counsel exercised their right under
the 2001 procedural rules to make allegations
beyond those made by the Commission and
independently alleged a violation of Article 8
(right to a fair trial). Although the Court did not
find sufficient evidence to substantiate the allegation of an Article 8 violation, its ruling did
acknowledge the right of a victim’s counsel to
make allegations beyond those alleged by the
Commission before the Court.
Both in complaints to the Court and in the
C o u rt’s decisions themselves, the rights to a fair
trial and to judicial protection (Articles 8 and
25) are generally discussed together. In this case,
however, they were considered separately, with
the Court finding an Article 25 violation, but
not an Article 8 violation. The Court found that
because the Pe ruvian government failed to comply with the Supreme Court’s decision to restore
the pensions, Peru had violated the pensioners’
right to judicial protection. Subsection (2)(c) of
A rticle 25 requires that the government ensure
the enforcement of remedies ordered by the
C o u rt. In this case, the government failed to do
so by refusing to comply with the Supreme
C o u rt’s ru l i n g .
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Additionally, the Court found that the State’s
arbitrary reduction of the pensions constituted a
violation of Article 21, the right to private pro pe rt y. The Court stated that, in accordance with
Pe ruvian domestic law, Article 21 protects the
right of the five pensioners to collect a pension
because it is an acquired right to property.
Traditionally, private property has been considered a tract of land or other tangible good. Yet in
this case, the Court elevates the status of a social
service from a privilege to a pro p e rty right that
cannot be limited or rescinded for any purpose
other than for reasons of public utility or social
interest. In this case, the reduction of the pensions had no public utility and did not serve the
social interest.
Finally, the Court did not find that the pension reduction in this case was a violation of
Article 26, the right to progressive development
of economic, social, and cultural rights. In this
decision, the Court offers a narrow interpre t ation of the Convention by holding that individuals and small groups cannot successfully claim
relief under Article 26 and that violations of that
a rticle can only occur on the scale of society at
large. The Court did not consider the limited
experience of five pensioners to be representative
of Pe ruvian society as a whole. This narrow interpretation will make it difficult to substantiate
Article 26 violations in future cases before the
C o u rt.
In its decision on damages, the Court
ordered Pe ru to pay $3,000 to each pensioner
plus litigation costs for violations of Articles 21
and 25.

JUAN HUMBERTO SÁNCHEZ V.
HONDURAS
Juan Humberto Sánchez was arbitrarily
detained by the Honduran military for his
alleged connection with the Farabundo Martí
National Liberation Front (FMLN), a
Salvadoran guerrilla movement. Sánchez was initially detained on July 10, 1992 and released the
following day for lack of evidence. He was then
re-captured by military agents the night of his
release while in his home. His corpse was found
with signs of tort u re on July 21, 1992.
In October 1992, the Commission for the
Defense of Human Rights in Central America
(CODEHUCA) filed a petition with the
Commission on behalf of Sánchez and his next
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of kin. The Commission decided in favor of the
victims after a merits hearing and brought the
case before the Court in September 2001.
CODEHUACA and CEJIL acted jointly as the
victims’ counsel before the Court .
Both the victims’ counsel and the
Commission alleged that Honduras had violated
several articles of the Convention, including
A rticles 4 (right to life), 5 (right to personal
integrity), 7 (right to personal liberty), 8 (right to
a fair trial), and 25 (right to judicial protection).
The Court found that Honduras had violated all
of the aforementioned articles of the
C o n vention.
The Court found that Honduras violated
A rticle 4 when Honduran military personnel
extrajudicially executed Sánchez. In its decision,
the Court expanded the notion of state responsibility for cases involving extrajudicial executions.
It held that a state can be liable for extrajudicial
e xecution not only through act or omission, but
also by failing to pre vent such an act from occurring. The Court held that the State not only has
a negative obligation to refrain from arbitrarily
depriving a person of his or her life, but has a
positive obligation to take the necessary steps to
protect and pre s e rve the right to life. The State
must uphold this positive obligation through
pre vention and punishment, especially in the
case of its own security forces. The Court framed
this execution as part of a larger pattern of extrajudicial execution tolerated, and even driven, by
the State.
The Court held that Honduras violated
Sánchez’s right to personal liberty through his
arbitrary detention, a violation of Article 7. It
found that the conditions of Sánchez’s detention
did not conform to the standards required by
A rticle 7. Sánchez was detained by military
agents, rather than police; he was detained at
night in his family’s home; he was not immediately put before a judge; and neither he nor his
family were informed of the reason for his detention as required under the Convention.
In addition, the Court held that the State
violated the personal integrity of both Sánchez
and his family members. By torturing Sánchez,
the State violated his physical integrity. The State
violated Sánchez’s family’s psychological and
moral integrity by treating Sánchez inhumanely
and executing him. A person’s physical, psychological, and moral integrity are all protected by
A rticle 5.
Finally, the Court held that Honduras had
violated Articles 8 and 25, the rights to a fair trial
and judicial protection. Because of the nature of
his illegal and arbitrary detention, Sánchez was

unable to access the judicial system, determine
the reasons for his arrest, seek legal counsel, or
defend himself in front of competent authorities.
The investigation of his execution was ineffective, resulting in the failure to identify and sanction those responsible. The Court found this
case to be representative of a larger pattern of
weak judicial protection in Honduras, with its
high rate of impunity, lack of judicial resources,
and ineffective investigations of extrajudicial executions.
In its decision on damages, the Court
ordered Honduras to pay $39,700 to Sánchez’s
family for material damages and $245,000 for
immaterial damages.

AFRICAN COMMISSION ON
HUMAN & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS
The African Commission on Human & Peoples’
Rights (Commission) came into force in 1986
after the Organization of African Union, now
the African Union, adopted the African Chart e r
on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Since its inception, the Commission’s mandate has been to
ensure the promotion and protection of human
rights throughout the African region. The 33rd
Ord i n a ry Session occurred earlier this year in
May. The 34th Ord i n a ry Session, originally
planned to take place in October, was rescheduled for November 6-20, 2003.

33RD ORDINARY SESSION:
ESTABLISHING NATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS
During May 15-29, 2003, the 33rd Ord i n a ry
Session of the Commission was held in Niamey,
Republic of Niger. The Commission addressed
several issues of note and adopted the Directives
and Principles on the Right to a Fair Trial and
Legal Aid in Africa. Further, the Commission
considered how it could find sufficient human
and financial support, as well as a suitable headquarters in order to increase its monitoring capabilities and strengthen its efficacy.
The Commission continued to encourage
the establishment of national institutions of
human rights by states that have not yet established them. The Commission outlined the
mandate for such institutions and urged the
countries that do not yet have them in place to
establish national institutions of human rights.
The Commission also continued to state its
determination to strengthen collaboration
between these institutions and the Commission.
Debate among non-governmental and international organizations continues on the effectiveness and the wisdom of establishing national
institutions of human rights. Se veral states have
33

established such commissions, but failed to provide sufficient amounts of funding and/or
appointed directors lacking prior experience in
the field of human rights. This has created
dependent institutions rather than institutions
that independently oversee government action.
Yet, some human rights groups feel that the
establishment of the institutions is a sign that
African governments, including some of the
most repressive, are accepting the international
human rights discourse and acknowledging that
human rights protections should be a part of
their government port f o l i o.
Human rights organizations also argue that
national institutions, often without hesitation,
are subjected to the whims of the government
body and used as a smokescreen to hide gove r nment human rights abuses. Further, the national
human rights institutions may actually undermine the work of the non-governmental organization (NGO) human rights community either
by denouncing their findings or by remaining
strategically silent on attacks of human rights
defenders.
Even so, the Commission views the national
institutions as bodies that strengthen the cooperation between the states’ governments and the
Commission. The Commission believes that
institutions provide a liaison between itself and
the individual government through which
g reater transparency and accountability is
achieved. A re p o rt by Human Rights Watch
offered hope in stating “the Ghanaian, South
African, and Ugandan [institutions] – a testament to the integrity of those [institutions’]
members – appear to be the most promising in
their willingness to actively speak out strongly
against government abuses and to exhibit their
independence in the interest of protecting the
rights of their citizens. Although it is still early,
the Malawian and Senegalese [institutions] also
show promise.”

THE 34TH ORDINARY SESSION:
REPORT ON ZIMBABWE AND THE
AFRICAN COURT ON HUMAN AND
PEOPLES’ RIGHTS
During the 34th Ord i n a ry Session, the
Commission intends to address and adopt the
draft re p o rt on the fact-finding mission to
Zi m b a bwe. Other countries such as Cote
d’Ivoire, the Seychelles, Niger, Djibouti, Sudan,
Angola, Libya, Cameroon, Benin and the
Democratic Republic of Congo will come under
the scrutiny of the Commission in the form of a
variety of re p o rts brought before it for adoption.
The Commission is also to address many of the
substantive issues in the implementation of the
continued on page 34
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continued from page 33

charter, as is its custom. The Commission
intends to address the proposed African Court
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Court) and create strategies for the ratification of the Protocol
to create such a court in those countries that
have not yet done so. In addition, the
Commission plans to discuss the situation of
human rights defenders, indigenous populations
and communities, refugees and displaced persons, and the human rights situation in Africa
generally.
Though recent human rights abuses in
Zi m b a bwe will not likely be in the
Commission's draft re p o rt arising from its factfinding mission (scheduled for presentation in
November of 2003), the draft re p o rt will likely
condemn the further breakdown of the rule of
law in Zimbabwe. For example, the re p o rt will
likely discuss increasing government controls on
independent media within the country. On
September 11, 2003 the Daily News of
Zi m b a bwe, the only independent newspaper in
Zimbabwe, was declared to be operating illegally
by the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe. The following day, September 12, 2003, the police raided the offices of the newspaper and seized their
computer equipment.
The Daily News was found in violation of the
Access to Information and Protection of Privacy
Act (AIPPA), a law put in place by President
Ro b e rt Mugabe that re q u i res the registration of
all media groups and journalists with the gove r nment’s Media and Information Commission
(MIC) and authorizes the operation of media
g roups and journalists only with the MIC’s
a p p roval. As of September 28, 2003, 9 journalists were charged with violating Section 83, governing the license requirement of the AIPPA,
and it was expected that fort y - f i ve additional
Daily News journalists would also be charged.
The journalists were charged with assisting in the
production of an illegal newspaper.
In response, the Daily News challenged the
constitutionality of the registration requirement,
but the challenge was unsuccessful. The Da i l y
News journalists who were charged with violating Section 83 of the AIPPA had applied for
accreditation but their applications were not forwarded through the MIC because of the constitutional challenge made by the Daily Ne w s. As a
result, the Daily News filed applications with the
Zimbabwean courts seeking an ove rturn of the
MIC’s decision to deny it a license and filed suit
seeking the return of their computer equipment.
Though the Commission itself did not
directly address the matter of establishing the
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, a
subsidiary conference occurred during the 33rd

Ord i n a ry Session. The Conference for West
African States on the Protocol for the
Establishment of the African Court on Human
and Peoples’ Rights (Conference) met in
Niamey, Niger on May 28-29, 2003. During the
C o n f e rence, the attendees sought the
Commission’s approval of the Protocol to establish the African Court on Human and Peoples’
Rights (Protocol). Senior representatives from 12
West African countries along with observer participants of additional countries attended the
conference.
The Protocol to the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the
Establishment of an African Court on Human
and Peoples’ Rights (Protocol) states that “[it]
shall come into force thirty days after fifteen
instruments of ratification or accession have
been deposited.” At the time of the Conference
in May, 9 states had ratified the Protocol, 3 states
were in the advanced stages of ratification, and 1
state was in the beginning stages of ratification.
The Conference proceeded to address the constraints and obstacles to the ratification of the
Protocol, as well as strategies to ensure early ratification of the Protocol by all West African
countries.
The Conference also established the
Coalition on the African Court on Human and
Peoples’ Rights (Coalition), a group comprised
of national human rights institutions as well as
national and international non-governmental
organizations. The Coalition’s mandate granted
it the power to facilitate full ratification of the
Protocol together with the De c l a r a t i o n
Accepting non-State Access to the Court under
A rticle 34(6) of the Protocol by all West African
states before October 21, 2003. In addition, the
Coalition was asked to work to realize the widest
possible ratification of the Protocol and to ensure
an early establishment of the Court.
Additionally, the Coalition was given the task of
establishing a liaison with the Commission of
the African Union and the Commission with the
purpose of ensuring the effective participation of
African Civil Society in resolving practical issues
associated with the establishment of an effective
C o u rt, such as the location of the headquarters,
the election of judges, the establishment of the
Re g i s t ry of the Court, Rules of Procedure and
the funding and complementarities between the
C o u rt and the Commission.
European Commission on Human
Rights
The Case of Ernst and Others v. Be l g i u m
On July 15, 2003, the European Court of
Human Rights (Court) unanimously held in
34

Ernest and Others v. Belgium that investigative
measures taken by Belgian authorities violated
freedom of expression and respect of private life
under Articles 10 and 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (Convention).
The four applicants are Belgian journalists
and their complaint stems from searches of their
offices and homes and from the seizure of documents carried out by Belgian authorities in 1995.
At the time, information surrounding certain
high profile criminal cases was leaked to members of the media. The investigating judge heading the prosecution for breach of confidence
ordered the Serious Crimes Squad to conduct
searches of the offices, homes, and two vehicles
belonging to the applicants. In the course of the
searches, the Crime Squad seized documents,
computer disks and the hard drives of the applicants’ computers. The length of these searches
varied between a half hour and three hours. The
applicants were neither informed of the reasons
for the search, nor were they notified that it was
to occur. The applicants were not named as civil
parties in the criminal investigation.
In September 1995, the applicants lodged a
complaint with the investigating judge of the
Brussels Court of First Instance. Because the case
was directed against a sitting judge, the case was
t r a n s f e r red to the pro s e c u t o r’s office, the
Minister of Justice, and finally to the Court of
Cassation. The Court of Cassation found the
complaint inadmissible because it exceeded the
jurisdiction of the Court, and the applicants
were informed that the Court would take no further action in their case.
Having exhausted their domestic remedies,
the applicants lodged a complaint with the
Eu ropean Commission of Human Rights
(Commission) in September 1996. When the
case was transferred to the Court in November
1998, the applicants asserted that the
Government’s action interf e red with their fre edom of expression in breach of Article 10 of the
Convention, violated their right to respect for
private life guaranteed by Article 8, discriminated against them under Articles 14 and 6, and
constituted a failure of effective remedy under
Article 13. They pre vailed on claims under
Article 10 and 8.
A rticle 10 of the Convention guarantees fre edom of expression subject to the state’s right to
implement legitimate measures under domestic
law that are necessary in a democratic society to
safeguard the public. When the press is involved,
the Court balances the interests of society in
maintaining the liberty of the press with the
goals of the state. In addition, the Court maintains that any measures impeding freedom of
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expression must be reasonably pro p o rtionate to
legitimate aims. The Court applied a three-part
test. First, the law must provide for the measure
in question. Second, the goal of the measure
must be legitimate. Third, there must be a satisf a c t o ry relationship between the measure and the
goals of the state.
In this case, the Court found the law provided for the measure. Second, the Court found
that the reason for the interf e rence in question
was primarily aimed at protecting the reputation
of others and maintaining the authority and
i m p a rtiality of the judiciary. Finally, in light of
the extensive nature of the searches, the Court
held that the Government had not demonstrated that the search and seizure procedure was nece s s a ry to determine whether the applicants were
p a rties to the offenses under investigation. Thus,
the Court found a violation of Article 10 and
turned to the applicants’ allegations under
A rticle 8.
A rticle 8 protects an individual’s right to
respect for private life from state infringement.
State administered measures that infringe upon
an individual’s right to respect for private life
must be provided for by the law and proportionate to a legitimate state aim. Thus, any interference with an Article 8 right must be narrowly
t a i l o red to legitimate goals.
In this case, the Court found the measure
was proscribed by the law and satisfied the first
requirement. The Court also found the
Government was pursuing legitimate state aims
of pre venting crime and protecting the rights
and freedoms of others. Howe ve r, the Court
found that the procedural safeguards employed
by Belgian authorities while conducting the
searches and seizures were not executed in a
manner pro p o rtionate to the legitimate aims
pursued. The applicants had been neither
accused of any offense nor had they been
informed of the reasons for the searches. The
search warrants were also drafted in overly broad
terms, allowing for the seizure of any document
or object that might further the investigation.
Therefore, the Court found a violation of Article
8 and ordered Belgium to pay each applicant two
thousand euros for moral damages and nine
thousand euros for the applicants’ fees and
expenses.
The Case of Karner v. Austria
In the case of K a rner v. Austria, decided on
July 24, 2003, the Court found that an Austrian
tenancy law was discriminatory on the basis of
sexual orientation and in violation of Articles 14
and 8 of the Convention.

Karner was an Austrian national who lived in
an apartment leased by his homosexual partner.
In 1991, his partner was diagnosed with HIV
and designated Mr. Karner his heir before his
death in 1994. In 1995, the landlord of the
a p a rtment instituted proceedings against Mr.
Karner in order to terminate his tenancy. Both
the District Court and the Regional Court
agreed with Mr. Karner and held that under the
Rent Act (the statute in question), the right to
succession of a tenancy equally applied to homosexual partners as well as to heterosexual couples.
Howe ver, on appeal, the Austrian Supreme
C o u rt re versed the judgment and terminated
Mr. Karner’s lease. The Supreme Court held that
the statutory language of “life companion” had
to be interpreted at the time of the enactment of
Rent Act of 1974, and that the legislature’s intention was to pre s e rve the traditional family and
exclude same-sex couples.
In 1997, Mr. Karner lodged a complaint
with Eu ropean Commission of Human Rights.
He alleged that the Supreme Court’s decision
not to recognize his right to succeed the tenancy
constituted discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation in violation of Article 14 of the
C o n vention read in conjunction with Article 8.
Be f o re the case was found admissible, Mr.
Karner passed away and his mother waived her
right to succeed to the estate. Mr. Karner’s lawye r
asked the Court not to strike the application
until other heirs to Mr. Karner’s estate were identified. When no heirs we re identified, the
Austrian Government requested the application
be struck from the list of cases because no one
intended to pursue Mr. Karner’s application.
Although no heirs came forw a rd, Mr.
Karner’s complaint was declared partly admissible. In many similar cases, the Court deferred to
the applicant’s heirs or close family. Because the
goal of the Convention system lies in individual
relief, the Court only strikes applications that
lack an individual wish to pursue proceedings.
However, the Court also hears applications on
public policy grounds. In this case, the Court
considered the differential treatment of homosexuals in relation to the succession of tenancies
under Austrian law an important question of
interest for both Austria and for other Member
States to the Convention. The Court noted that
continued examination of Mr. Karner’s case
would “elucidate, safeguard and develop the
standards of protection under the Convention.”
Judge Grabenwarter, alone in his dissent,
stated that although combating discrimination
against homosexuals is an important human
rights concern, it does not justify continued
examination of a case after the applicant’s death.
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He highlighted that under Article 37 of the
Convention, the Court may decide, at any time
in the proceeding, to strike an application if circumstances indicate that the applicant will not
pursue the application. He argued that the
C o u rt had taken a significant misstep in its
jurisprudence by not striking down the case.
The Court decided to continue the examination of the case, affirming that the subject matter of the application was properly squared with
Article 8, paragraph 1, treating elements of private life, family, and home. In addition, the
C o u rt held that but for his sexual orientation,
Mr. Karner could have been accepted as a life
companion entitled to succession of his partner’s
lease, and thus, Article 14 was applicable. In its
decision, the Court highlighted the principle of
proportionality, which provides that differential
treatment is discriminatory if it does not pursue
a legitimate aim or if the means employed are
dispro p o rtionate to the aim sought. Particularly
serious reasons are necessary to justify differential
treatment based on sexual orientation.
The Court accepted the theoretical justification for differential treatment given by the
Government that the statutory provision aimed
to protect the traditional family unit. But in
keeping with the principle of pro p o rtionality, the
C o u rt deemed the aim too abstract and not narrowly tailored. The Government was required to
demonstrate that the exclusion of homosexual
couples from the scope of the legislation was nece s s a ry to protect the traditional family unit.
Because the Government did not offer arguments to support this conclusion, it did not justify the interpretation of the statutory provision
within its limited 1974 context. Therefore, the
C o u rtfound a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8. HRB
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